The Supreme Court\u27s Reticent Qualified Immunity Retreat by Crocker, Katherine Mims
Duke Law Journal Online 
VOLUME 71  SEPTEMBER 2021 
THE SUPREME COURT’S RETICENT  
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY RETREAT 
KATHERINE MIMS CROCKER†
ABSTRACT 
  The recent outcry against qualified immunity, a doctrine that 
disallows damages actions against government officials for a wide 
swath of constitutional claims, has been deafening. But when the 
Supreme Court in November 2020 and February 2021 invalidated 
grants of qualified immunity based on reasoning at the heart of the 
doctrine for the first time since John Roberts became Chief Justice, the 
response was muted. With initial evaluations and competing 
understandings coming from legal commentators in the months since, 
this Essay explores what these cases appear to say about qualified 
immunity for today and tomorrow.  
  The Essay traces idealistic, pessimistic, and optimistic impressions 
of these cases’ importance from the perspective of a qualified-immunity 
critic. The Essay argues that the optimistic view probably gets things 
right in that the Court is taking tentative steps forward by precluding 
some of the doctrine’s most extreme consequences. The Essay then 
contends that this modest move nevertheless demonstrates why those 
concerned about qualified immunity should focus not only on the 
courts, but also on the other branches of government—and not only on 
one doctrine, but also on constitutional-tort law as a whole. In and 
beyond the recent reform-minded moment, we should think big about 
how to improve constitutional enforcement: bigger than the judiciary 
and bigger than qualified immunity. 
INTRODUCTION 
 If you missed a recent Supreme Court case rejecting a claim of 
qualified immunity (yes, rejecting a claim of qualified immunity) 
without merits briefing or oral argument, you are not alone. With the 
decision issued November 2, 2020, it was bound to get lost in the 
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shuffle. November 2, after all, was the day before Election Day, and 
legal commentators, like much of the American public, were focused 
on the protracted ballot count and contentious presidential transition 
for months afterward. 
What is clear is that the summary reversal in Taylor v. Riojas1 and 
a follow-up order in McCoy v. Alamu2 deserve more attention than 
they have received. To call qualified immunity a hot topic would risk 
understatement. As part of the movement for police reform and racial 
justice amplified by George Floyd’s murder last year, reconsidering 
qualified immunity has become a cause célèbre.3 A large reason, as the 
ensuing discussion describes, is because of the way the Roberts Court 
has coddled qualified immunity, which in extensive circumstances 
blocks lawsuits seeking money damages against government officials 
for federal constitutional violations. Taylor and McCoy deviate from 
that theme. 
 Less clear are to what doctrinal end these cases may lead and, 
therefore, to what extent the legal community, and especially those 
who criticize the Court’s overaggressive and undertheorized qualified-
immunity case law, should consider them significant. This Essay 
explores what Taylor and McCoy appear to say about qualified 
immunity for today and tomorrow—that is, about where the doctrine 
stands now and where it could go from here. 
 To help set the stage: qualified immunity’s canonical 
formulation comes from the 1982 case Harlow v. Fitzgerald.4 
Concerned about “subject[ing] government officials . . . to the costs of 
trial” and “the burdens of broad-reaching discovery,” the Court in 
Harlow declared that “government officials performing discretionary 
functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar 
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”5 Harlow itself was a case against White House officials.6 But 
the Court quickly expanded the doctrine to cover essentially all 
executive officials in the local, state, and federal systems—including 
 
 1.  Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52 (2020) (per curiam). 
 2.  McCoy v. Alamu, 141 S. Ct. 1364 (2021) (mem.). 
 3.  See Madeleine Carlisle, The Debate over Qualified Immunity Is at the Heart of Police 
Reform. Here’s What to Know, TIME (June 3, 2021, 6:35 PM), https://time.com/6061624/what-is-
qualified-immunity/?s=09 [https://perma.cc/R9Y8-WJ46]. 
 4.  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 5.  Id. at 817–18. 
 6.  Id. at 802 (identifying the defendants as “senior White House aides to former President 
Richard M. Nixon”). 
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line-level law-enforcement and corrections officers.7 Over time, the 
Court likewise expanded the doctrine to cover more and more conduct 
by narrowing the notion of clearly established rights, such as through 
limiting which sources of law count in the analysis.8 Increasingly for 
nearly forty years, therefore, qualified immunity had caused plaintiffs 
alleging constitutional violations to face difficulties securing judgments 
for monetary relief. Enter Taylor and McCoy.  
 This Essay proceeds in four short parts. Part I outlines the 
background of and decision in Taylor, and Part II does the same thing 
for McCoy. Part III asks what these cases mean for qualified immunity 
today. This Part employs the perspective of a qualified-immunity critic 
to identify and assess idealistic, pessimistic, and optimistic 
understandings of the opinions, arguing that the optimistic outlook is 
probably the most accurate. Part IV asks what Taylor and McCoy 
mean for qualified immunity tomorrow. This Part contends that while 
these cases move courts closer to a sensible constitutional-enforcement 
scheme, much remains to be done beyond both the judicial system and 
qualified immunity itself.  
I.  TAYLOR 
 Trent Michael Taylor, a Texas state prisoner, sued prison 
officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Eighth Amendment 
by allegedly placing him in conditions the Supreme Court called 
“shockingly unsanitary.”9 Taylor claimed that over six days, officials 
housed him first in a cell “covered” with “‘“massive amounts” of feces’: 
all over the floor, the ceiling, the window, the walls, and even ‘packed 
inside the water faucet.’”10 Officials then purportedly moved him to a 
“frigidly cold cell,” where he was “left to sleep naked in sewage” 
because the room “was equipped with only a clogged drain in the floor 
to dispose of bodily wastes.”11 
 The defendants asserted qualified immunity, and the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision granting it.12 While the 
Fifth Circuit said that Taylor “showed genuine disputes about a 
constitutional violation,” it concluded that the defendants did not have 
 
 7.  See Katherine Mims Crocker, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Structure, 117 
MICH. L. REV. 1405, 1432–33 (2019). 
 8.  See id. at 1414. 
 9.  Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53 (2020) (per curiam). 
 10.  Id. (quoting Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d 211, 218 (5th Cir. 2019)).  
 11.  Id.  
 12.  See id.; id. at 54 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).  
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“‘fair warning’ that their specific acts” infringed his rights.13 The 
Supreme Court disagreed with the Fifth Circuit, vacating the judgment 
and remanding the matter in an exercise known as a summary 
reversal.14 The case was on summary judgment, so the Court’s 
disposition had the effect of sending it back for additional proceedings 
(and perhaps settlement). 
 The Fifth Circuit’s ruling in favor of the defendants on qualified-
immunity grounds was foreseeable even given the egregious 
allegations because of the arc of Supreme Court precedent. Prior to 
Taylor, the Court had not rejected an assertion of qualified immunity 
on the substance of the defense since Groh v. Ramirez15 in 2004, a year 
before Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court. Over and over again, 
the Court instead instructed tribunals they should grant qualified 
immunity to “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate the law.”16 Cases from this timeframe showed what a low bar 
the Court was using. In Safford Unified School District v. Redding,17 for 
instance, the Court granted qualified immunity to school officials who 
strip-searched a thirteen-year-old girl for pills after finding “common 
pain relievers equivalent to two Advil” she had allegedly distributed.18 
And in Kisela v. Hughes,19 the Court granted qualified immunity to a 
police officer who without warning repeatedly shot a woman holding a 
kitchen knife at her side.20 
 
 13.  Taylor, 946 F.3d at 222 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). 
 14.  See Taylor, 141 S. Ct. at 54; STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, KENNETH S. GELLER, TIMOTHY S. 
BISHOP, EDWARD A. HARTNETT & DAN HIMMELFARB, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 5-36 (11th 
ed. 2019) (“This kind of reversal order usually reflects the feeling of a majority of the Court that 
the lower court result is so clearly erroneous, particularly if there is a controlling Supreme Court 
precedent to the contrary, that full briefing and argument would be a waste of time.”); id. at 5-37 
(characterizing some summary vacaturs in the same manner as summary reversals). 
 15.  See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 564 (2004). 
 16.  E.g., Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6 (2013) (per curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 
563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)). 
 17.  Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009). 
 18.  Id. at 368–69, 375–76. The Court explained that two school officials told the girl “to 
remove her clothes down to her underwear, and then ‘pull out’ her bra and the elastic band on 
her underpants.” Id. at 374. The Court said that while “[t]he exact label for this” conduct was “not 
important,” a “strip search” was “a fair way to speak of it.” Id. 
 19.  Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (per curiam). 
 20.  Id. at 1150–52.  The officer had “arrived on the scene after hearing a police radio report 
that a woman was engaging in erratic behavior with a knife.” Id. at 1150. At the time the officer 
fired, the woman “had taken steps toward another woman standing nearby, and had refused to 
drop the knife after at least two commands to do so.” Id. The dissent argued, however, that “[t]he 
record, properly construed at this stage,” indicated that “at the time of the shooting,” the woman 
“stood stationary about six feet away” from the other woman and “appeared ‘composed and 
content.’” Id. at 1155 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting the record). 
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 To be fair, the Court during this period occasionally ruled 
against officials claiming qualified immunity. In Tolan v. Cotton,21 for 
instance, the Justices in 2014 vacated and remanded a judgment for 
proper application of the summary-judgment standard.22 And in Sause 
v. Bauer,23 the Justices in 2018 did the same thing for proper application 
of the motion-to-dismiss standard.24  
 Never until Taylor, however, did the Roberts Court deny a claim 
of qualified immunity on grounds going to the heart of the defense—
that the alleged conduct “violate[d] clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” 
to quote the Harlow test.25 The Court in Taylor stated that “[q]ualified 
immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, 
even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law 
governing the circumstances she confronted.”26 But the Court ruled 
that “no reasonable correctional officer could have concluded that, 
under the extreme circumstances of this case, it was constitutionally 
permissible to house Taylor in such deplorably unsanitary conditions 
for such an extended period of time.”27 
II.  MCCOY 
 Like Taylor, Prince McCoy was a Texas state prisoner at the 
time of the allegations underlying his case. McCoy claimed that a guard 
sprayed him “directly in the face with mace for no reason,” causing 
“‘burning skin and eyes, congested lungs, difficulty breathing, stomach 
pain, vision impairment, anxiety, nightmares, depression, and other 
 
 21.  Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014) (per curiam). 
 22.  Id. at 651. The plaintiff, Robbie Tolan, has done remarkable work recounting his story 
about surviving a police shooting set in motion by a botched license-plate lookup. See Barry 
Svrluga, The Black Baseball Prospect, the Police Shooting and the Club He Never Wanted To Join, 
WASH. POST. (Dec. 31, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2020/12/31/
robbie-tolan-police-shooting [https://perma.cc/CN7Z-JWBJ].  
 23.  Sause v. Bauer, 138 S. Ct. 2561 (2018) (per curiam). 
 24.  Id. at 2563. 
 25.  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 26.  Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53 (2020) (per curiam) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 
U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam)). 
 27.  Id. 
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emotional distress.’”28 McCoy sued the guard for excessive force under 
the Eighth Amendment.29 
 While the Fifth Circuit said a reasonable jury could have 
concluded that McCoy suffered a constitutional wrong, the court 
nevertheless granted the guard qualified immunity.30 Partly because an 
administrative report found that the guard “used less than the full can 
of spray,” the Fifth Circuit said “it was not beyond debate that” 
McCoy’s allegations “crossed the line dividing a de minimis use of force 
from a cognizable one.”31 
 McCoy sought review, and the Supreme Court responded in a 
two-sentence order: “The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. 
The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light 
of Taylor v. Riojas,”32 which had not yet come down when the lower 
court considered McCoy’s case. That articulation is customary for a 
“GVR” (grant, vacate, and remand)—a maneuver the Court often 
makes where it has issued a decision with the potential to affect the 
outcome of a case on the certiorari docket since the case was decided 
below.33  
 
 28.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4–5, McCoy v. Alamu, 141 S. Ct. 1364 (2021) (mem.) 
(No. 20-31) (quoting McCoy v. Alamu, 950 F.3d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 2020)), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/20/20-31/147498/20200710160817184_McCoy%20
Cert%20Petition%20to%20File.pdf [https://perma.cc/28QM-M3US]. More specifically, McCoy 
suggested that the guard was upset with another prisoner who threw water and that the guard 
took his anger out on McCoy after the other prisoner blocked his own cell from the spray. Id. at 
4.  
 29.  Id. at 5. 
 30.  McCoy, 950 F.3d at 232–33. 
 31.  Id. at 233. 
 32.  McCoy, 141 S. Ct. at 1364. 
 33.  See SHAPIRO, GELLER, BISHOP, HARTNETT & HIMMELFARB, supra note 14, at 4-21 
(explaining that a GVR may be used where “[a] court of appeals decision predates [a] conflicting 
Supreme Court decision” to allow the lower court to reconsider the matter “in the light of the 
recent decision”); see also Lawrence ex rel. Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996) (per 
curiam) (explaining that a GVR may be used “[w]here intervening developments . . . reveal a 
reasonable probability that the decision below rests upon a premise that the lower court would 
reject if given the opportunity for further consideration, and where it appears that such a 
redetermination may determine the ultimate outcome of the litigation”); Henry v. City of Rock 
Hill, 376 U.S. 776, 777 (1964) (per curiam) (explaining that a GVR “indicate[s] that [the Court] 
found [its intervening decision] sufficiently analogous and, perhaps, decisive to compel re-
examination of the case”). 
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III.  TODAY 
 Taylor and McCoy are significant simply for softening the 
decade-plus streak of extreme deference to defendants on qualified 
immunity’s central issue of whether the relevant right was sufficiently 
clear. But what do these decisions mean for the doctrine today? As 
with so many Supreme Court actions, the answer lies in the eye of the 
beholder. But contextual clues lend support to a middle-of-the-road 
understanding. 
 At one pole, an idealist might think Taylor and McCoy represent 
a major upheaval in qualified-immunity law. Professor Colin Miller, for 
instance, has argued that these cases may have “significantly shrunk 
the qualified immunity defense and expanded the constellation of cases 
in which citizens can vindicate violations of their constitutional 
rights.”34 After all, Taylor not only stopped the sixteen-year run of the 
Court refusing to reject the substance of a qualified-immunity 
assertion; McCoy also appeared to confirm that Taylor reinvigorated a 
relatively plaintiff-friendly theory that many analysts had assumed the 
Court abandoned long ago.35 This was the notion from the 2002 case 
Hope v. Pelzer36 that “officials can still be on notice that their conduct 
 
 34.  Colin Miller, Essay, The End of Comparative Qualified Immunity, 99 TEX. L. REV. 
ONLINE 217, 224 (2021) [hereinafter Miller, Comparative Qualified Immunity] (contending in 
particular that “comparative qualified immunity”—through which “government officials who 
violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights immunized themselves from liability by citing to cases in 
which similar, less egregious conduct was deemed constitutional”—“might have met its end”); see 
also Anya Bidwell & Patrick Jaicomo, Opinion, Lower Courts Take Notice: The Supreme Court 
Is Rethinking Qualified Immunity, USA TODAY (Mar. 2, 2021, 8:59 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/03/02/supreme-court-might-rethinking-qualified-
immunity-column/4576549001 [https://perma.cc/H3HK-DSEW] (stating that “[t]hese are still 
early days in the reconsideration—if not ultimate rejection—of the court-created doctrine” but 
that “the Supreme Court may now be entering a new dawn on qualified immunity”); Colin Miller, 
The Supreme Court Issues a (Possibly) Landmark Ruling on Qualified Immunity, 
EVIDENCEPROF BLOG (Feb. 23, 2021), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2021/02/
yesterday-the-united-states-supreme-court-issued-a-summary-disposition-inmccoy-v-alamu-
that-could-end-up-being-a-landmark-r.html [https://perma.cc/W5GQ-ER25] (suggesting that 
Taylor and McCoy amount to “a seismic shift in qualified immunity law that will great [sic] 
constrict the availability of the qualified immunity test”). 
 35.  See, e.g., Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 
23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 946–47 (2015); Karen Blum, Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. 
Schwartz, Qualified Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. 
REV. 633, 654, 657 (2013); Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of 
Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and 
Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 
MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1247 (2015). 
 36.  Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
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violates established law even in novel factual circumstances”37—in 
essence, where no factually on-point precedent exists.  
 The Fifth Circuit in Taylor wrote that while “the law was clear 
that prisoners couldn’t be housed in cells teeming with human waste 
for months on end,” the fact that the court “hadn’t previously held that 
a time period so short [as six days] violated the Constitution” meant 
Taylor’s claim was “doom[ed].”38 Not so, the Justices said, relying on 
Hope for the proposition that “a general constitutional rule already 
identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the 
specific conduct in question.”39 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in McCoy 
reasoned that “[t]he dispositive question is whether the violative 
nature of particular conduct is clearly established.”40 Satisfying this 
standard, the court continued, “‘is especially difficult in excessive-force 
cases’ such as McCoy’s, because ‘the result depends very much on the 
facts of each case.’”41 By invoking Taylor in vacating this judgment, the 
Justices suggested that the McCoy panel parsed the precedent too 
finely.42 
 At the other pole, a pessimist might think Taylor and McCoy 
mean (at most) that qualified immunity is not quite absolute immunity, 
a doctrinal cousin that generally forbids damages actions for federal 
constitutional claims challenging legislative, judicial, and limited other 
functions regardless of how outrageously unlawful the defendant’s 
 
 37.  Id. at 741.  
 38.  Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d 211, 222 (5th Cir. 2019).  
 39.  Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53–54 (2020) (per curiam) (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 
741); see Erwin Chemerinsky, SCOTUS Hands Down a Rare Civil Rights Victory on Qualified 
Immunity, ABA J. (Feb. 1, 2021, 9:11 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/columns/article/
chemerinsky-scotus-hands-down-a-rare-civil-rights-victory-on-qualified-immunity 
[https://perma.cc/FYU2-UH7L] (“Taylor v. Riojas is especially important because it reaffirms 
Hope v. Pelzer and that there does not need to be a case on point for a plaintiff to prevail and 
overcome qualified immunity.”). 
 40.  McCoy v. Alamu, 950 F.3d 226, 232 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 
7, 12 (2015) (per curiam)). 
 41.  Id. at 233 (quoting Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 876 (5th Cir. 2019)). 
 42.  In Taylor, the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s reliance on “‘ambiguity in the caselaw’ 
regarding whether ‘a time period so short [as six days] violated the Constitution.’” 141 S. Ct. at 54 
n.2 (quoting Taylor, 946 F.3d at 222). The decision to which the Fifth Circuit pointed, the Court 
said, “is too dissimilar, in terms of both conditions and duration of confinement, to create any 
doubt about the obviousness of Taylor’s right.” Id. (citing Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1004 (5th 
Cir. 1998)). By ordering reconsideration in light of Taylor, the Court indicated that the Fifth 
Circuit’s reliance on prior caselaw in McCoy may have likewise been insufficient to support 
qualified immunity there. See McCoy, 950 F.3d at 233 (stating that “[i]n somewhat related 
circumstances, we held that spraying a prisoner with a fire extinguisher ‘was a de minimis use of 
physical force and was not repugnant to the conscience of mankind’” (quoting Jackson v. 
Culbertson, 984 F.2d 699, 700 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)). 
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conduct may have been.43 One commentator, for instance, has argued 
even in light of Taylor that “[t]he Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
qualified immunity has effectively granted absolute immunity to 
government officials.”44  
 As it turns out, recent actions had made the contrast between 
qualified and absolute immunity seem far from tautological. For just 
one example, consider Jessop v. City of Fresno,45 where the plaintiffs 
alleged that police officers stole property valued at hundreds of 
thousands of dollars after seizing it while executing a search warrant.46 
The Ninth Circuit granted the defendants qualified immunity on the 
ground that no clearly established law declared this conduct 
unconstitutional.47 By denying certiorari in a case presenting such 
extreme allegations,48 the Court arguably suggested that qualified 
immunity provided protection as strong as absolute immunity would 
have. 
 An optimist—less and more hopeful than the idealist and the 
pessimist, respectively—might think Taylor and McCoy represent 
some progress in the right direction while recognizing that they 
probably do not fundamentally transform qualified-immunity doctrine. 
Cato Institute Research Fellow Jay Schweikert, for instance, has 
written that while Taylor and McCoy “suggest the Justices want to curb 
the worst excesses of the doctrine,” these cases “also suggest the 
 
 43.  For an overview of absolute-immunity doctrine and how it differs from qualified-
immunity doctrine, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & 
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 1038–39, 1043–47 (7th ed. 2015); and see generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Absolute 
Immunity: General Principles and Recent Developments, 24 TOURO L. REV. 473 (2008).  
 44.  Nathaniel Rubin, Taylor v. Riojas: Qualified Immunity in 2020, ARIZ. ST. L.J. BLOG 
(Feb. 1, 2021), https://arizonastatelawjournal.org/2021/02/01/taylor-v-riojas-qualified-immunity-
in-2020/ [https://perma.cc/D3KQ-BW9K]. Relatedly, in an opinion recognizing Taylor, the 
Seventh Circuit stated that “[d]etermining whether an officer violates clearly established law 
requires a look at past cases with specificity” but that the “assessment does not require a case with 
identical factual circumstances, lest qualified immunity become absolute immunity.” Lopez v. 
Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 993 F.3d 981, 988, 991 (7th Cir. 2021).   
 45.  Jessop v. City of Fresno, 936 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2793 (2020) 
(mem).  
 46.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5–7, Jessop v. City of Fresno, 140 S. Ct. 2793 (2020) 
(mem.) (No. 19-1021), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-1021/133072/202002141
33249205_19-__%20Jessop%20Petition%202.14.2020%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PWH-
YSGL]. 
 47.  Jessop, 936 F.3d at 939. 
 48.  Jessop, 140 S. Ct. at 2793. 
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Supreme Court is not going to take up the larger question of whether 
qualified immunity itself should be reconsidered.”49  
 The optimist knows there are several factors pushing against an 
idealistic interpretation. Taylor’s principal opinion is only about two 
pages long, avoiding more questions than it answers. The Justices 
decided both Taylor and McCoy as part of their much-maligned 
“shadow docket” without merits briefing or oral argument,50 both of 
which could have put more fundamental issues on the table. And the 
majority in Taylor called the allegations “particularly egregious,”51 
meaning (perhaps depending on one’s perception of the facts 
underlying McCoy52) the case may reveal relatively little about the 
Court’s posture toward more run-of-the-mill government misconduct. 
What is more, during the previous summer, the Court passed over 
multiple qualified-immunity cases teeing up the doctrine for revision 
or repudiation.53 Had the Court wanted to reconsider the doctrine in a 
broader way, those cases presented a prime opportunity.54  
 While suggesting that Taylor has some teeth, McCoy is even 
more ambiguous in certain ways. A GVR (unlike a summary reversal) 
means not necessarily that the lower court’s judgment was incorrect, 
 
 49.  Jay Schweikert, The Supreme Court Won’t Save Us from Qualified Immunity, CATO 
INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (Mar. 3, 2021, 4:58 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/supreme-court-
wont-save-us-qualified-immunity [https://perma.cc/2899-4J2U]; see also Adam Liptak, Cracks in 
a Legal Shield for Officers’ Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES: SIDEBAR (Mar. 25, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/08/us/supreme-court-qualified-immunity.html 
[https://perma.cc/5TGX-3KJ8] (quoting Professor Alex Reinert as stating that “[t]he Supreme 
Court remains very committed to qualified immunity being a forceful defense in civil rights cases 
and certainly in police excessive force cases”). 
 50.  See, e.g., William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& LIBERTY 1, 1 (2015) (coining the term “shadow docket” to describe “a range of orders and 
summary decisions that defy [the Court’s] normal procedural regularity”); id. at 18 (observing 
that “the Court could do more to reassure us that” the products of the shadow docket are not 
“thoughtless or the result of unjustified inconsistency”); Stephen I. Vladeck, Essay, The Solicitor 
General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123, 156–58 (2019) (discussing the shadow 
docket’s “[m]essiness,” especially in the context of the federal government seeking stays of 
injunctions). 
 51.  Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 54 (2020) (per curiam).  
 52.  See Miller, Comparative Qualified Immunity, supra note 34, at 223 (stating that while 
the conduct alleged in McCoy “was unconstitutional, it would be difficult to characterize it as 
‘particularly egregious’ without making a similar finding about most other unconstitutional 
behavior by government officers who seek qualified immunity”). 
 53.  Josh Gerstein, Supreme Court Turns Down Cases on ‘Qualified Immunity’ for Police, 
POLITICO (June 15, 2020, 3:08 PM), https://politi.co/2BcpYwm [https://perma.cc/7SW3-F5G3].  
 54.  The Court has also denied other petitions seeking to overturn grants of qualified 
immunity since then. See Hoggard v. Rhodes, 141 S. Ct. 2421 (2021) (mem.), denying cert. to 973 
F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2020); Howse v. Hodous, 141 S. Ct. 1515 (2021) (mem.), denying cert. to 953 
F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2020). 
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but rather that the lower court’s logic was incomplete in light of 
subsequent events.55 So in McCoy, the Fifth Circuit—which in the 
normal course sent the case back to the district court “in accordance 
with the judgment of the Supreme Court” while “express[ing] no view” 
about what should happen on remand56—could potentially hold that 
the guard deserves qualified immunity again.57 For these reasons and 
others, there is ample cause to doubt that Taylor and McCoy signify a 
sharp shift in the Court’s overall attitude about constitutional 
enforcement. 
 The pessimistic perspective may seem more accurate than the 
idealistic view. But the pessimistic perspective still probably misses the 
mark. Had the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s approval of qualified 
immunity in Taylor and McCoy, one could argue that qualified 
immunity had become functionally indistinguishable from absolute 
immunity (as others have argued before58). But the Court could have 
simply declined to take any action on these cases in the first place. As 
a formal matter, a “cert” denial does not signify support for the 
underlying decision.59 And as a functional matter, several of last 
 
 55.  See SHAPIRO, GELLER, BISHOP, HARTNETT & HIMMELFARB, supra note 14, at 5-42 
(stating that “the summary reconsideration order” does not seem to be “the functional equivalent 
of a summary reversal order” but instead seems to instruct the lower court “to reconsider the 
entire case in light of the intervening precedent—which may or may not compel a different 
result”); see also id. at 4-21 through -22 & nn.36–37 (collecting cases). 
 56.  McCoy v. Alamu, 842 F. App’x 933, 933 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). 
 57.  Indeed, in a recent skirmish over yet another Fifth Circuit case holding that qualified 
immunity was warranted, Judge Willett argued that the court was not taking Taylor and McCoy 
seriously enough. See Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 2 F.4th 506, 522–23 (5th Cir. 2021) (Willett, J., 
dissenting from the denial of reh’g en banc) (arguing that “while these quiet, ‘shadow docket’ 
actions may not portend a fundamental rethinking of qualified immunity, the Court seems 
determined to dial back the doctrine’s harshest excesses” and that “the Court is warning us to 
tread more carefully when reviewing obviously violative conduct”). In Ramirez, police officers 
allegedly tased Gabriel Eduardo Olivas “[w]hile responding to a 911 call reporting that Olivas 
was threatening to kill himself and burn down his family’s house” despite the officers knowing 
that Olivas had doused himself in gasoline and despite another officer’s warning that tasing Olivas 
would set him on fire. Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 844 F. App’x 710, 711–12 (5th Cir. 2021) (per 
curiam). The panel explained what happened next: “Olivas was engulfed in flames. The house 
burned down. Olivas died of his injuries several days later.” Id. at 711. The district court denied 
the defendants’ motion to dismiss on qualified-immunity grounds; the panel reversed; and the full 
Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, prompting Judge Willett’s dissent. See Ramirez, 2 F.4th at 
516–17 (Willett, J., dissenting from the denial of reh’g en banc). 
 58.  See David M. Shapiro & Charles Hogle, The Horror Chamber: Unqualified Impunity in 
Prison, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2021, 2023 (2018) (claiming that “the present liability regime” 
for prison officials “borders on de facto absolute immunity”). 
 59.  See North Carolina v. N.C. State Conf. of NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399, 1400 (2017) (mem.) 
(Roberts, C.J., respecting the denial of cert.) (“[I]t is important to recall our frequent admonition 
that ‘[t]he denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the 
case.’” (quoting United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923))). 
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summer’s rejected petitions—including in Jessop—could have easily 
exposed the Court to the same objection that failing to intervene 
amounted to tacitly approving a transformation of qualified immunity 
into absolute immunity,60 but the Court still chose to remain silent. In 
short, there are good reasons to read more into the Court’s 
intervention in Taylor and McCoy than that the Justices felt obliged to 
indicate that some space still exists between qualified and absolute 
immunity.  
 Optimism seems to strike a better balance than idealism or 
pessimism does here. Consider the Court’s composition, which 
suggests a fair amount of cross-ideological support for restraining 
qualified immunity in both Taylor and McCoy. While the complete 
vote lineups are unclear, for Taylor, it seems safe to assume that every 
member of the so-called liberal wing (meaning Justices Breyer, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan) joined the principal opinion, which was 
unsigned.61 So to make a majority, at least two of the so-called 
conservative Justices must have agreed with the Court’s course of 
action. Justice Barrett, who had just been confirmed, did not 
participate.62 Justice Thomas (who has expressed skepticism about 
qualified immunity on several occasions63) dissented without 
explaining why.64 And Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, saying 
the case was uncertworthy—but that if a conclusion was necessary, the 
outcome was correct.65 The votes of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh are unknown, but all three may have agreed 
with both the cert grant and the ultimate decision. For McCoy, there 
were no noted dissents.66 So the full Court may well have thought 
Taylor supported vacating the Fifth Circuit’s judgment. 
 
 60.  See George F. Will, Opinion, This Doctrine Has Nullified Accountability for Police. The 
Supreme Court Can Rethink It., WASH. POST (May 13, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/will-the-supreme-court-rectify-its-qualified-immunity-mistake/2020/05/12/05659d0e-94
78-11ea-9f5e-56d8239bf9ad_story.html [https://perma.cc/T6AK-YE5C] (discussing these cases).  
 61.  See Alexander A. Reinert, Qualified Immunity on Appeal: An Empirical Assessment 
48–50 (Mar. 4, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3798024 
[https://perma.cc/4SZS-WNMK] (discussing ideology-related implications of an empirical study 
of appellate decisions about qualified immunity). 
 62.  See Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 54 (2020) (per curiam). 
 63.  See Hoggard v. Rhodes, 141 S. Ct. 2421, 2421–22 (2021) (mem.) (Thomas, J., respecting 
the denial of cert.); Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1862–65 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting from the denial of cert.); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1869–72 (2017) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 64.  Taylor, 141 S. Ct. at 54 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 65.  Id. at 54–56 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 66.  McCoy v. Alamu, 141 S. Ct. 1364, 1364 (2021) (mem.). 
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 In light of all this, one could surmise that Taylor and McCoy 
supply a limited response to the recent revolt against qualified 
immunity. One could draw some assurance from the fact that a wide-
ranging coalition on the Court came together around this issue at this 
time. And one could hope these cases presage more legitimacy-
enhancing consensus at this particular point in the nation’s history. 
 Taylor and McCoy, though, also demonstrate how the Court 
frequently moves forward with the smallest of steps (when it moves 
forward at all). Even in praising these decisions, qualified-immunity 
critics have observed that the Court’s message is “quiet[]” and 
“subtle,” a call audible only to “civil-rights lawyers and judges who are 
listening.”67 The judiciary’s adherence to precedent and other 
procedural values often makes its tendency toward incrementalism 
more right than wrong. But while larger—and louder—judge-made 
alterations would be well justified in the qualified-immunity area,68 
there is little reason to expect to see them from One First Street any 
time soon. 
IV. TOMORROW 
 What, then, do Taylor and McCoy mean for qualified immunity 
tomorrow? The above analysis indicates that the movement to reform 
the doctrine has gathered so much steam that even the majority-
conservative Supreme Court recognizes the need for restraint, at least 
at the margins. But the movement probably still faces a long road 
within the judicial system, such that reform proponents should 
continue focusing efforts on the more political branches of government 
as well.69 While the Court has offered shifting justifications for 
 
 67.  Joanna Schwartz, The Supreme Court Is Giving Lower Courts a Subtle Hint To Rein In 
Police Misconduct, ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/03/
the-supreme-courts-message-on-police-misconduct-is-changing/618193 [https://perma.cc/645G-
V76V]; see also Billy Binion, A Prison Guard Who Pepper-Sprayed an Inmate Without 
Provocation Got Qualified Immunity. SCOTUS Disagreed., REASON (Feb. 23, 2021, 12:44 PM), 
https://reason.com/2021/02/23/supreme-court-qualfied-immunity-prison-guard-5th-circuit-
mccoy-alamu [https://perma.cc/7M44-RK2X] (stating that McCoy was “subtle and went 
unnoticed by just about every major news outlet”). 
 68.  See Crocker, supra note 7, at 1458–60 (arguing that “rejecting Harlow-style qualified 
immunity would seem well warranted,” that stare decisis “‘is not an inexorable command,’ as the 
Court has made especially clear in the qualified-immunity context,” and that “there are good 
reasons to think that completely eliminating qualified immunity would not cause the sky to fall” 
(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009))). 
 69.  See Schweikert, supra note 49 (“At this point, the only realistic prospect of actual 
qualified immunity reform is from legislatures, not the Supreme Court.”); Ilya Somin, Supreme 
Court Rejects Qualified Immunity Defense for the First Time in Years, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Nov. 2, 2021, 10:21 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/11/02/supreme-court-rejects-qualified-
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qualified immunity, Justices have sometimes admitted that the doctrine 
rests on policy preferences.70 Justice Kennedy once, for instance, said 
that the jurisprudence had “depart[ed] from history in the name of 
public policy, reshaping immunity doctrines in light of those policy 
considerations.”71 Indeed, it is widely believed that qualified immunity 
is susceptible to legislative modification.72 
 Because the Court decides discrete issues in discrete cases, 
moreover, our elected representatives are often best equipped to 
recalibrate multiple legal lines in tandem. And reexamining qualified 
immunity requires reexamining related realms as well—a point I detail 
in a forthcoming article.73 Qualified immunity did not grow up in a 
vacuum and does not operate in one now. The doctrine’s rise and role 
are intertwined with the Court’s commitment to yet another immunity 
principle: sovereign immunity, which shields state and federal entities 
from damages actions for constitutional claims.74 Other areas of 
constitutional enforcement—like rigid limitations on suits against 
federal officers and onerous standards for holding municipalities 
liable—bear close connections to sovereign immunity too.75 And 
employer indemnification of monetary costs supposedly carried by 
individual officers, while underappreciated in constitutional-tort law, 
 
immunity-defense-for-the-first-time-in-years [https://perma.cc/7DHH-J72Q] (“History shows 
that successful movements to strengthen protection for constitutional rights usually combine 
litigation with political action, as opposed to exclusively relying on one strategy to the exclusion 
of the other. Hopefully, the cross-ideological movement to end qualified immunity can continue 
to make progress in the same way.”). 
 70.  Katherine Mims Crocker, A Scapegoat Theory of Bivens, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1943, 1963 (2021) (stating that “with respect to qualified immunity,” the Court “casts about for a 
dizzying array of constitutional, statutory, and other justifications” but that “Justices have 
occasionally been forthcoming about the subjective nature of their handiwork”). 
 71.  Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 72.  See, e.g., Roger Michalski & Stephen Rushin, Essay, Federal (De)funding of Local 
Police, 110 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 54, 63 (2021) (stating that “Congress could overrule the qualified 
immunity doctrine”); Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Boldest Lie, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 
605, 677–78 (2021) (arguing that “[m]ounting evidence of qualified immunity’s failures offers 
ample justification for Congress or the Supreme Court to abolish qualified immunity” and that 
“[i]f Congress or the Supreme Court decides to amend qualified immunity instead of ending it, 
the definition of ‘clearly established law’ should be at the top of the list for adjustment”); see also 
William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 80–82 (2018) (exploring 
arguments for and against congressional authority to change qualified-immunity doctrine). 
 73.  See Katherine Mims Crocker, Qualified Immunity, Sovereign Immunity, and Systemic 
Reform, 71 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 5–7), https://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=3796337 [https://perma.cc/G28U-HKZJ]. 
 74.  See id. at 16–25. 
 75.  See id. 
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plays an overwhelming part in constitutional-tort practice.76 As I 
explain in the forthcoming article, all this and more suggest that in 
important ways, qualified immunity is just part of a much larger set of 
challenges surrounding American constitutional accountability.77 
 Congress should make defined but decisive changes in this area 
of law. In doing so, however, Congress should account for the full 
complexity of the constitutional-tort system rather than becoming 
absorbed with the qualified-immunity component alone. My work 
therefore proposes that legislators should contemplate both 
eliminating qualified immunity and establishing entity liability under a 
respondeat superior standard now for Fourth Amendment excessive-
force claims, which occupy the core of the public’s recent concerns, and 
later (after learning from the initial experience) for other kinds of 
constitutional violations.78  
 Since the last presidential campaign, President Biden has 
signaled support for “rein[ing] in” qualified immunity, especially 
where “abuses of power” like police chokeholds are involved.79 
Democrats have been on board.80 And while prospects in the Senate 
have been declared dead,81 the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 
2021 as passed by the House would have (among other initiatives) 
eliminated qualified immunity in the law-enforcement context.82 Some 
behind-the-scenes proposals for bipartisan congressional compromise, 
 
 76.  See id. at 26–35; see generally James E. Pfander, Alexander A. Reinert & Joanna C. 
Schwartz, The Myth of Personal Liability: Who Pays When Bivens Claims Succeed, 72 STAN. L. 
REV. 561 (2020) (studying indemnification in the federal-officer context); Joanna C. Schwartz, 
Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014) (studying indemnification in the state- and 
local-officer context). 
 77.  See generally Crocker, supra note 73. 
 78.  See id. at 44–52; see also Katherine Mims Crocker, Reconsidering Section 1983’s 
Nonabrogation of Sovereign Immunity, 73 FLA. L. REV. 523, 585–88 (2021). 
 79.  The Reidout: Symone Sanders: Biden Believes ‘Qualified Immunity Needs To Be Reined 
In,’ at 1:30–48 (MSNBC television broadcast Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.msnbc.com/the-
reidout/watch/symone-sanders-biden-believes-qualified-immunity-needs-to-be-reined-in-906988
21998 [https://perma.cc/BYT3-FNZ3]. 
 80.  Scott Shackford, Democratic Party Platform Calls for ‘Reining In’ Qualified Immunity. 
Why Not Eliminate It?, REASON (Aug. 20, 2020, 2:05 PM), https://reason.com/2020/08/20/
democratic-party-platform-calls-for-reining-in-qualified-immunity-why-not-eliminate-it 
[https://perma.cc/L69C-B3SL]. 
 81.  Marianne Levine & Nicholas Wu, Bipartisan Police Reform Talks Crumble, POLITICO 
(Sept. 22, 2021, 4:08 PM), https://politi.co/3kv8mQE [https://perma.cc/ME3Z-LCCK]. 
 82.  See George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. § 102 (2021) 
(as passed by House, Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1280 
[https://perma.cc/5ZMR-VGVF]. 
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moreover, contemplated entity liability instead of or in addition to 
individual liability for constitutional violations.83 
 Other possible reforms include increasing transparency about 
how constitutional-tort litigation actually works. The Cost of Police 
Misconduct Act of 2021, for example, seeks to require law-
enforcement agencies “to report on an annual basis allegations of 
misconduct by [their] officers and judgments or settlements related to 
such misconduct, including settlements reached before a lawsuit has 
been filed,” along with (among other information) “the source of 
money used” to dispose of each judgment or settlement.84 At least in 
the law-enforcement context, shining this kind of sunlight on payment 
realities should help illuminate faulty assumptions underlying much 
constitutional-tort doctrine—including that individual officials are 
often subject to substantial financial burdens and that formally shifting 
liability onto their employers’ shoulders would run high risks of 
crippling public fiscs.85  
 The point, in short, is that the American people and our elected 
representatives can and should think big when it comes to improving 
how constitutional enforcement works: bigger than the courts and 
bigger than qualified immunity. Regardless of what happens during the 
current legislative session, congresspeople can and should continue 
reconsidering this area of law. And they should do so from the ground 
up. 
 
 83.  See Seung Min Kim, Annie Linskey & Marianna Sotomayor, Chauvin Verdict Injects a 
Fresh Jolt of Momentum into Police Overhaul Efforts, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2021, 7:58 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/chauvin-verdict-police-overhaul/2021/04/21/fa47d65c-
a2a0-11eb-85fc-06664ff4489d_story.html [https://perma.cc/9UPH-C5XF] (stating that Senator 
Tim Scott said “one potential compromise is holding liable police departments, rather than 
individual officers”); Anya Bidwell, Patrick Jaicomo & Nick Sibilla, Opinion, Hope for Reforming 
Qualified Immunity? It May Lie in a Compromise Bill, a Leaked Draft Shows, USA TODAY (July 
27, 2021, 4:27 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/06/24/reform-qualified-
immunity-hold-federal-officers-accountable/7705663002 [https://perma.cc/5BLL-BUQC] 
(describing and providing a link to draft legislation). 
 84.  Press Release, Joint Economic Committee Democrats, Beyer, Kaine Introduce 
Legislation to Address the Cost of Police Misconduct to Municipal Governments (Mar. 2, 2021), 
https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/democrats/2021/3/beyer-kaine-introduce-
legislation-to-address-the-cost-of-police-misconduct-to-municipal-governments 
[https://perma.cc/NAQ5-W3UR]; see Cost of Police Misconduct Act of 2021, S. 540, 117th Cong. 
(2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/540 [https://perma.cc/79E8-
42FJ]; Cost of Police Misconduct Act of 2021, H.R. 1481, 117th Cong. (2021), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1481 [https://perma.cc/2A9K-DXJT]. 
 85.  See Crocker, supra note 73, at 53–55. 
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CONCLUSION 
 For today, Taylor and McCoy mark a reticent qualified-
immunity retreat, serving as modest but important moves toward 
holding government actors accountable for unconstitutional conduct. 
For tomorrow, qualified-immunity critics should keep endeavoring to 
make the political process expand on the Supreme Court’s 
characteristically measured course correction by addressing 
constitutional-tort law’s infirmities in far more comprehensive ways. 
  
